refuses an answer. Our hermeneutic impulses are easily seduced and misled, and readers are tempted to produce a univocal response to Kafka's finitudein-question. Is he able to die? A whole squad of readers won't hesitate to disavow and kill off the anxiety provoked by the unanswerable, responding: No, he's not able to, he'll survive. The question of finitude, or, more precisely, finitude-becomequestion, seems to elicit an attitude of irresponsible, thereby all-too-responsive, reading that sets out to destroy the question. Let me, instead, imagine a reading that would adhere to an ethicity of protecting the question's demande, and endure the without-response of the other's infinitely deferred demise. For narrating life, in Kafka's sense, means to abide the unanswerable, the immeasurable orifice of the question in question: Kann er denn sterben?
For the moment, and to start off the exploration of an infinite narrative, let me propose the following premise: Kafka's scene of questioning secures the problem of life's finitude as an encounter with alterity. Thorough readers of Heidegger, in the wake of Levinas' appropriation, have brilliantly elucidated this entanglement, as they engaged Dasein's thrown Being-towarddeath and its relation to otherness. Avital Ronell (1989: 57) , for one, has importantly emphasized that Dasein's uncanny experience of "anxiety, fascination, and guilt" coincides with its originary encountering "an anonymous Other". Facing down Heidegger's ontology of death from within its own lexicon, Ronell moreover illuminates the inherently problematic relation between Thing and Other, which, in Heidegger, "can […] be seen to assume a clean ontological separation" (1962: 24) yet, in Kafka, becomes essentially scrambled. Kafka provokes his family man with a sheer range of ontological transgressions as he stages his alien invader as a being that entertains contradictory traits of thingness, animality, as well as humanness -while all the time functioning as the messenger of death, standing as the target of finitude's defiant question.
The reader's impossible task therefore manifests as a tracing of the blurred ontological distinctions put forth by Kafka, and as an exploration of how their precarity relates to a shattered phenomenology of death, instituted by a question without response. Thus, I repeat the question for lack of a solution. In fact, if there is something that can be proven or demonstrated, if there is an insight I find myself offering, if there is a purpose to this address, it's to foreground and underscore the importance of the question -the question as question, in its radical openness, cause of so much hermeneutical frustration and misguided scholarly resolve: is he able to die? The threads of my investigation will lead me, finally, to also zone in on the oddity of death conceptualized as capacity. What does it mean to render dying in terms of a capacitation, even bearing a shadow of agency? And how does the ability to
